For about three minutes on a Friday night, Kava’s lending protocol believed one account held roughly 1.25 billion BUSD. The protocol had multiplied every BUSD deposit about 243,000-fold, so the attacker’s deposit counted as that much collateral.
The account held only a sliver of it, but the protocol took the number at face value and paid out accordingly. Attackers drained 53.9 million KAVA, and about 49.2 million of it crossed LayerZero to BNB Chain. Here is how the loop worked, where the money went and what is still unaccounted for.
A Rounding Gap in a Market Nobody Used
HARD Lend, which Kava also calls Kava Lend, runs a BUSD market that outlived the stablecoin’s active life. Paxos halted BUSD issuance in 2023, yet the market stayed live on Kava, and it was nearly empty before the attack.
The flaw sat in how the protocol pays depositors. According to its public source code, Kava Lend divides the interest borrowers pay by the market’s net supply. The code skips that division when supply is exactly zero, but it does nothing about tiny, non-zero figures.
The attacker found that gap. At 11:01 p.m. ET on Friday, a small BUSD loan pushed the market’s net supply down to two hundred-millionths of a dollar. Within three minutes, every BUSD deposit in the market was worth roughly 243,000 times more. Kava’s own account traces the attack to an accounting flaw in the dormant BUSD collateral market.
Nor was this an impulse hit. On-chain activity shows the attacker ran repeated deposit and borrow cycles in the BUSD market starting November 8, about five days earlier.
127 Loans, One Hollow Pool
Once the collateral looked enormous, the attacker started pulling out KAVA. They borrowed against the inflated deposit 127 times, using a second account to clear each loan and sidestep the cap on KAVA borrowing. Kava describes the same pattern from its side: manipulated BUSD valuations let the attackers borrow KAVA over and over and trigger liquidations that wiped out debts without returning the borrowed tokens.
The totals shift depending on who is counting. Bitquery found about 55.2 million KAVA borrowed in all, with 53.9 million kept after repayments involving other borrowers. Kava uses the lower figure, since it measures tokens stolen rather than tokens borrowed.
The pool emptied fast. Kava Lend’s module account went from 55.33 million KAVA to 0.19 KAVA in a little over an hour and a half. At the pre-attack price of $0.068, those tokens were worth about $3.76 million, while Kava’s own valuation of the stolen tokens was about $1.83 million. The gap reflects the price slide that followed.
Kava stayed quiet for hours. Its first acknowledgment, posted on X at 6:28 a.m. ET Saturday, came more than seven hours after the attack began. By Kava’s clock, the incident falls on November 14.
Following 49.2M KAVA Across LayerZero
The exit began early Saturday. At 4:59 a.m. ET, the attacker started bridging about 49.2 million KAVA through Kava’s LayerZero bridge to an address on BNB Chain. That is about 91% of the haul. Most of it sold within the hour for 3,006.5 BNB and 231,557 USDT, worth roughly $2.09 million combined. Another 4.58 million KAVA or so went to five unlabeled addresses on Kava.
Bitquery’s sales tally runs slightly lower. It traced sales of 48.4 million KAVA that produced about $2.09 million in BNB and USDT, which leaves roughly 800,000 KAVA that crossed the bridge without showing up in the traced sales.
Containment moved on two tracks. At 9:05 a.m. ET, Kava paused the Axelar bridge as a precaution, even though the stolen KAVA left through LayerZero. Meanwhile, Korean exchanges Upbit and Bithumb suspended KAVA deposits and withdrawals, and KAVA fell to around $0.042, down about 39% in 24 hours.
Where the Trail Goes Cold on BNB Chain
The BNB-side money is the hardest piece to follow. By The Block’s figures, BNB made up about nine-tenths of the $2.09 million in proceeds, and that BNB has since been moved out.
One leg did hit a wall. Bitquery found a failed transaction involving 612,416 USDT through the Relay bridge, which rejected the transfer with a “BLOCKED_WALLET” message and stopped the payout to Ethereum. That amount is about 29% of the traced sale proceeds, and its final status has not been disclosed.
Kava says recovery work is underway. Some stolen funds have been frozen, and the team is working with exchanges and law enforcement to trace the rest. Contributors are also working with ecosystem security teams and major trading platforms on tracing and legal recovery for the funds sent to BNB Chain. Still, Kava has not said how much it has secured, or whether the frozen funds include the USDT Bitquery identified.
That leaves four open questions. Where did the BNB go after it left the BSC address? How much has been frozen? What happened to the blocked USDT? And who controls the 4.58 million KAVA sitting in five addresses on Kava itself?
Kava’s Response and the Votes on Mintscan
Kava says it has fixed the bug. It patched the flaw, added safeguards against a repeat and plans to wind down the remaining HARD Lend positions in an orderly process. The incident stayed within the HARD Lend application and did not compromise the Kava chain. According to Kava, no new KAVA was created and individual deposits were largely unaffected.
The governance track is public on Mintscan’s Kava proposals page. Two proposals went live November 16 and run through November 23.
Proposal 223 freezes Kava Lend borrowing by setting every borrowing cap to zero and restoring the USD 10 minimum, while still allowing repayments.
As of Thursday, November 19, it showed 100% yes, with 89,362,171 KAVA in favor, just 1,785 KAVA against and 41 KAVA on veto. Turnout stood at 70.12% against a 20% quorum, and Mintscan flagged it as on track to pass.
Proposal 224 restores the Kava Stability Committee’s Lend risk permissions, adding BitGo WBTC and Meson mBTC to the MoneyMarkets whitelist.
It showed 99.41% yes, with 95,012,237 KAVA in favor, 755 KAVA against and 566,285 KAVA abstaining, on 75.00% turnout. Neither vote is final until it closes November 23.
The borrowing freeze matters beyond the headline. Bitquery warned that the attacker’s inflated BUSD claim still exists and that new BUSD deposits could be drained, and zeroing out the borrowing caps closes that door.
What the Exploit Says About Dormant DeFi Markets
The weak spot here was an edge case. One guard handled a supply of zero, and nothing handled a supply of almost zero. That small gap, in a market few people used, was enough to drain a lending pool.
Kava is not alone. Cronos halted its network in August after an exploit of lending protocol Tectonic, estimated at $75 million, and Hedera’s Bonzo Lend lost roughly $9 million in July. Each case involved borrowing against collateral worth far less than the protocol believed.
Depositors are the group to watch next. Bitquery’s reconstruction showed the pool owing about 55.2 million KAVA to users while holding 0.19 KAVA, and Kava has not said the drained funds will be returned in full. Keep an eye on the final tallies on November 23, any disclosure of frozen amounts, and whether the BNB leg of the trail surfaces on an exchange.

